Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 2

Issue 4

Article 3

1914

The Grand Jury and Self-Incrimination
William H. Townsend

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Townsend, William H. (1914) "The Grand Jury and Self-Incrimination," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 2: Iss. 4,
Article 3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol2/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL.
with an abandonment of the twin solecism involved in repealing bad
law by overruling bad decisions.
(4) The courts should restrict themselves in the preparation
of written opinions to a succinct statement of the grounds upon which
the ultimate judgment or decree is intenled to be rested. By an
adherence to this principle, not only would the courts be removed
from the temptation to write too much, but they would also be enabled to decide cases more expeditiously, and therefore, with greater
satisfaction to the litigant, if not to the lawyer, who represents him.
If the judges in administering justice between litigants would
recognize these principles, which I sincerely believe to be written into
the constitution, or necessarily implied therein, there would be little
or no occasion for any discussion of the recall of judicial decisions
and none for the recall of judges, except incase of actual corruption.
0

THE GRAND JURY AND SELF-INCRIMINATION
The functions of a grand jury have come down to us almost
unimpaired. There is no branch of the court machinery which ih its
present day form antedates it. We are told by "Wilkins in his history
of the laws of the Anglo-Saxons that it existed at the time of
Ethelred. As administered by the Saxons it-onsisted of twelve men,
Seniores thani, as they were called, who were directed, under their
oaths to accuse no innocent man nor to permit any .rimfna! to
escape. Brocton, an early English commentator, is wliority for
the statement that at the time of Henry III., it was tl.e practice of
the courts to have four Knights for every hundred, who elected twelve
other Knights, "free and lawful men," thus increasing the number
to sixteen. Towards the close of the reign of Edward III., in addition to the inquest for the honored, the sheriff, by statute, was required to return a panel for the whole county, which was called le
graunde inquest, from which is derived the term grand jury."
Even at these rmote beginnings the grand jurors were instructed
that presentments, or indictmerts, were to be returned in every instance where the evidence presented gave reasonable grounds for suspecting a crime or an offense had been committed, it being the practise to let the accused present his side of the case at the trial as is
done today. Under the English procedure some one was apIointed
by the court to swear all witnesses who testified at a grand jury hearing, the practise of permitting the foreman of the jury to administer
this oath not having obtained.
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To such an extent has the grand jury become an integral part
of the administration of justice among the English speaking races,
that the creation of such a body by the organic law of a State is
seldom found. The Constitution of Kentuicky creates no such body
but its existence as a part of the criminal administration by the
courts, is recognized by a provision which fixes the number of the
panel at twelve instead of sixteen, as formerly. In England, at present
the grand jury, for all practical purposes is a mere farce. Its scope
has never been extended as it has in this country, vhere its power
both in the Federal and State courts, are almost unabridged. Not
only may it present felonies, misdemeanors, treason, and all penal
offenses, but it may indict for nuisance public and private; misfeasance and malfeasance in office, malpractice, the violations of all statutes punishable by fine, and has supervision, at the same time, over
the public roads, public institutions, such as the jails, reformatories,
asylumns, and penitentiaries.
Out of the fact that a grand jury panel has always been recognized as a purely inquisitorial body, that it is not a trial body, but
merely a court of inquest, has caused much discussion and contrariety
of opinion concerning the privilege of witnesses who testify before it,
and how far a witness may be compelled to give testimony that
would tend to criminate himself. The English courts have guarded
with zealous care the rights of a witness, where he might divulge
that which would expose himself to a criminal prosecution. As far
back as William the Conqueror there may be traced a constitutional
protection against self-incrimination. And curiously enough the
question was largely the outgrowth of a contest between the courts
of the common law and the church, and the political and ecclesiastical
issues that disturbed England during the period of the dictatorial
Stuarts. During the Anglo-Saxon period the bishops of the church
sat as judges and heard suits in the civil courts. All this was
abolished by the Conqueror, who directed the bishops to decide their
questions according to the ecclesiastical law, the result being in a
double court. The struggle between the State and church between
the time of Henry II. and Henry VIII., a period of some four hundred
years, concerning the rights of jurisdiction over laymen, as between
the civil and church courts, if they accomplished nothing more, led
up to a clear and distinct development of the rights of the individual
against self-incrimination. Under the oath administered in a church
trial the accused was put through a sort of inquisitorial process
which compelled the witness to "make true answers to all things
which should be asked of him." But the courts of law, throughout
the whose discussion never lost sight of the distinctive fact that there
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must be a presentment, a quitam, or grand jury proceeding, and in
these proceedings the evidence in support of the presentment must be
furnished by accusing witnesses and not by the accused. This entire
controversy, however, was ended by the statutes of Elizabeth and
James, which limited the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts
to "matters matrimonial and testamentary," thus removing the
hazard of self-incrimination under oath from the church courts, and
restoring the right of self-protection to all hearings in the legal
courts. This question, which it took centuries in England to determine, has never been the subject of dispute in this country. The
powers and duties of grand juries, ingrafted into our system by the
Constitution, are, generally speaking, such as were possessed by
grand juries at the common law, that is making return of indictments or presentments found on the testimony of accusing witnesses,
that is witnesses for the State, or upon facts within the knowledge of
the individual members of the grand jury. The legislative bodies
of our country have in a number of instances attempted to create
organizations, with inquisitorial powers, such as Commerce Commissions, Railroad Commissions, and public utilities commissions of
various kinds, but these have found no favor in the courts. Indeed
our system of law does not contemplate the theory of general inquisitorial power in a grand jury, the theory of our criminal proceeding
on the contrary, like that of Great Britian, being accusatory rather
than inquisitorial, (United States vs. James, 6o Fed., 257.) And
against a witness being compelled to give incriminating testimony
there is a Constitutional guaranty, and a broad construction in favor
of this right, in the absence of immunity statutes, has always been
given by the courts. Under our procedure there need be no definite
charge before a grand jury can proceed, but against incriminating
himself in giving testimony before a grand jury investigation, the
witness has always been protected.
It is provided by Article 5, of the Amendments to the Constitution that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself." Some difference of opinion concerning
the use of the term "criminal case," as distinguishing a trial from a
grand jury investigation has arisen, but the courts have generally
construed the language of the amendment to include any judicial
hearing. Discussing this subject Justice Brown, in Hall vs. Henkel,
201 U. S., 67, explains the purposes of this Amendment:
"The object of the amendment (5th) is to establish in express
language and upon a firm basis the general principle of English and
American jurisprudence, that no one shall be compelled to give
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testimony which may expose him to prosecution for crime. It is not
declared that he may not be compelled to testify to facts which may
impair his reputation for probity, or even tend to disgrace him, but
the line is drawn at testimony which may expose him to prosecution.
If the testimony relate to criminal acts long since past, and against
the prosecution of which the statute of limitations has run, or for
which he has already received a pardon, or is guaranteed an immunity,
the amendment does not apply."
The foregoing case was an appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Southern District of New
York, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus, and remanding the petitioner to the custody of the marshal. The proceeding originated in a
subpoena duces tecum directiLg the 1e1Ztioner to a)pear in court "to
testify and give evidence" in an action brought under the Sherman
anti-trust act. The witness appeared before the grand jury in obedience to the subpoena, but before being sworn demanded to know the
nature of the investigation, whether under any statute of the United
States and the specific charge, if any had been made. The grand
jury informed him that there was no specific charge against any one,
but the witness declined to produce the books and papers designated
in the subpoena, and declined to testify.himself, because, among other
reasons, his answers might incriminate him. These facts being reported to the judge of the court the witness was held to be in contempt, and committed to the custody of the marshal.
By Act of Congress, passed in 19o3, it was provided that "no
person shall be prosecuted or be subject to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution under said acts," meaning the anti-trust acts.
In determining whether by the terms of the Amendment its
provisions included a grand jury hearing, justice Brown in this same
case, said:
"While there may be some doubt whether the examination of a
witness before a grand jury is a suit or prosecution we have no doubt
that it is a "proceeding" within the meaning of the proviso. The
word should receive as wide a construction as is necessary to protect
the witness in his disclosures, whenever such disclosures are made in
pursuance of a judicial inquiry, whether such inquiry be instituted
by a grand jury, or upon the trial of an indictment found by them.
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The word "proceeding" is not a technical one, and is aptly used by the
courts to designate an inquiry before a grand jury."
It may be said, by this decision, all doubt concerning the selfincriminating provision of the 5th amendment, applies as well to a
hearing before a grand jury as it does to a hearing on an indictment found by a grand jury. But it may be said the introduction of
the 5th amendment applies only where the witness is asked to incriminate himself, that is, give testimony which niight expose him to
a criminal charge, and where there exists an immunity statute, which
gives the witness absolute protection, he can, by the processes of
the court, be punished for contempt if he refuse to testify at a grand
jury hearing. This question was fully discussed and determined in
Brown vs. Walker, i61 U. S., 591.
Determined then by the present statutes of the law, it may be
said that the Constitutional interdiction is an absolute protection to
the witness from giving testimony before any judicial tribunal which
would criminate him, but that no witness could refuse to testify
where there was a statutory immunity.
W. H. TOWNSEND.

THE INCOME TAX
The Act of Congress, providing for a Federal Income Tax became a law on October 3rd, 1913. It imposes an assessment of
I per cent per annum, known as the normal tax, upon the entire net
income arising or accruing from all sources in the preceding Calendar
year to:
(i) Every citizen of the United States, whether residing at
home or abroad.
(2) Every person residing in the United States, though not a
citizen thereof.
The normal tax of I per cent per annum is levied upon the
entire net income, not exceeding the sum of $2o,ooo per annum. A
further assessment, known as the additional tax, is levied upon net
incomes exceeding $2o,ooo, as follows :--On amounts of income from
$2o,ooo to $5oooo-i per cent additional tax; from $5o,ooo to $75,ooo
2 per cent; from $75,000 to $Iooooo--3 per cent; from $ioo,ooo to
$25o,ooo-4 per cent; from $250,000 to $5oo,ooo-5 per cent; and 6
per cent upon all income exceeding $500,000.

The Income Tax law allows certain exemptions and deductions.
Section C., provides:

